The Communion Argument: An Evidence-Based Case for Trinitarian Theism
Author: JD Longmire
Abstract
This paper introduces and defends a novel argument for theism – the Communion Argument – which proceeds from the empirically well-established fact that human beings are constitutively relational. Drawing on convergent evidence from developmental psychology, social neuroscience, epidemiology, anthropology, and phenomenology, I argue that the human orientation toward personal communion requires metaphysical explanation. I evaluate two candidate explanations: (A) naturalism, which treats relational constitution as an ungrounded evolutionary accident, and (B) theism, which grounds it in an ultimate reality that is itself personal and relational. I argue that theism provides a superior explanation. Further, I demonstrate that the specifically Trinitarian conception of God (one God eternally existing as three persons in communion) is not merely a theological postulate but is evidentially established through historical testimony concerning Jesus of Nazareth, the evidence for his resurrection, and the early church’s experience of the Spirit. Finally, I present a striking practical confirmation: despite unprecedented advances in psychological and psychiatric science, rates of loneliness, anxiety, depression, and relational breakdown continue to rise, suggesting that naturalistic frameworks, however sophisticated in description, cannot restore what they have accurately diagnosed. The Communion Argument thus provides a complete evidential pathway from empirical data about human nature to Trinitarian Christianity, with existential implications for human healing and hope.
Keywords: philosophy of religion, theism, Trinity, communion, attachment theory, social neuroscience, natural theology, resurrection, historical Jesus, therapeutic failure, mental health
1. Introduction
The classical arguments for God’s existence proceed from various starting points: the contingency of beings (cosmological argument), the appearance of design (teleological argument), the existence of objective moral duties (moral argument), or the reality of conscious experience (argument from consciousness). Each begins with some feature of reality and argues that theism provides the best explanation.
This paper introduces a distinct argument – the Communion Argument – which begins from a different datum: the constitutively relational nature of human persons. Human beings are not isolated individuals who contingently enter into relationships; rather, we are made for communion. Our deepest fulfilments and our deepest sufferings are personal and relational. This is not merely philosophical speculation but an empirically robust finding confirmed across multiple disciplines.
A common objection to arguments from natural theology is that even if successful, they establish only generic theism: a “god of the philosophers” rather than the God of Christian faith. The Communion Argument addresses this objection directly. The argument points toward a God who is inherently relational, not solitary but communal in the divine nature itself. Moreover, the specifically Trinitarian specification of this relational God is not an arbitrary theological addition but is itself evidentially grounded in historical testimony, the resurrection of Jesus, and the early church’s experience of the Spirit.
The paper also examines a striking practical implication: if naturalism were true and sufficient, we would expect that accurate scientific description of human relationality would yield effective therapeutic intervention. Yet despite unprecedented advances in psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience, rates of loneliness, anxiety, depression, and suicide continue to rise. This therapeutic failure provides existential confirmation of the argument’s thesis: human brokenness is personal, not merely functional, and requires personal healing (reconciliation) rather than mechanical intervention.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical evidence for human relational constitution. Section 3 articulates the argument’s formal structure. Section 4 evaluates the competing explanations. Section 5 establishes the evidential basis for the Trinitarian specification. Section 6 examines the therapeutic implications. Section 7 addresses objections. Section 8 presents the complete evidential chain and concludes.
2. The Evidential Base: Human Beings as Constitutively Relational
The claim that humans are “made for communion” might appear to be mere poetry or theological assertion. In fact, it is one of the most robustly confirmed findings across the human sciences.
2.1 Developmental Psychology: Attachment Theory
The foundational work of John Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980) and Mary Ainsworth (Ainsworth et al., 1978) established that human development is inherently relational. Infants do not first exist as isolated selves who subsequently learn to relate; rather, selfhood emerges through attachment relationships.
Bowlby’s attachment theory demonstrates that infants are biologically predisposed to seek proximity to caregivers, and that the quality of early attachment relationships shapes psychological development across the lifespan. Ainsworth’s Strange Situation protocol identified distinct attachment patterns (secure, anxious-ambivalent, and avoidant) that predict social, emotional, and cognitive outcomes decades later (Sroufe, 2005).
As Bowlby (1969, p. 177) observed, “the propensity to make strong emotional bonds to particular individuals [is] a basic component of human nature.”
Longitudinal research confirms this. The Minnesota Longitudinal Study of Risk and Adaptation, spanning over 35 years, demonstrates that early attachment security predicts relationship quality, emotional regulation, and psychological health throughout adulthood (Sroufe et al., 2005). Secure attachment in infancy correlates with greater social competence at age 10 (r = 0.44), more positive peer relationships in adolescence, and healthier romantic relationships in adulthood.
Meta-analytic evidence reinforces these findings. Groh et al. (2017) analysed 80 independent samples (N = 4,441) and found that attachment insecurity significantly predicted externalising problems (d = 0.31), with larger effects for disorganised attachment (d = 0.34). Fearon et al. (2010), in a meta-analysis of 69 studies (N = 5,947), found that insecure attachment, particularly disorganised attachment, was significantly associated with behavioural problems in childhood.
The developmental evidence confirms that personhood is constituted in and through attachment relationships.
2.2 Social Neuroscience: The Relational Brain
Neuroscientific research reveals that the human brain is fundamentally a social organ.
Mirror Neuron Systems. The discovery of mirror neurons (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) demonstrated that the primate brain contains systems that activate both when performing an action and when observing another perform that action. Iacoboni (2009) argues that mirror neuron systems provide the neural basis for our fundamental capacity to understand others as persons rather than objects.
Social Pain and Physical Pain. Functional neuroimaging studies demonstrate that social rejection activates the same neural regions as physical pain. Eisenberger, Lieberman and Williams (2003) used a virtual ball-tossing game (Cyberball) to induce social exclusion while participants underwent fMRI scanning. Excluded participants showed increased activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and anterior insula, regions consistently associated with the affective component of physical pain.
Kross et al. (2011) found that recalling a recent romantic rejection activated the secondary somatosensory cortex and dorsal posterior insula, regions previously associated with physical pain sensation itself. The neural overlap between social and physical pain suggests that social connection is literally essential to human wellbeing.
Default Mode Network. When the brain is not engaged in task-focused cognition, it defaults to a network of regions associated with social cognition. The default mode network (DMN), identified by Raichle et al. (2001), includes the medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and temporoparietal junction, regions implicated in thinking about others, self-reflection, and mentalising.
Schilbach et al. (2008) found substantial overlap between the DMN and regions activated during social cognitive tasks, suggesting that social cognition is the brain’s “default” mode.
Neurochemistry of Bonding. The neurochemical systems underlying social bonding, particularly oxytocin and vasopressin, are increasingly well understood. Oxytocin is released during positive social interactions and promotes trust, bonding, and prosocial behaviour (Kosfeld et al., 2005).
2.3 Epidemiology: Social Connection and Mortality
Perhaps the most striking evidence for human relational constitution comes from epidemiological research. Loneliness does not merely feel bad; it kills.
Holt-Lunstad, Smith and Layton (2010), in a meta-analysis of 148 prospective studies involving 308,849 participants followed for an average of 7.5 years, found that individuals with stronger social relationships had a 50% greater likelihood of survival compared to those with weaker social relationships (OR = 1.50, 95% CI: 1.42–1.59).
To contextualise this effect size:
Risk Factor Odds Ratio for Mortality Lack of social relationships 1.50 Smoking (≤15 cigarettes/day) 1.50 Alcohol consumption (>6 drinks/day) 1.37 Physical inactivity 1.25 Obesity (BMI > 30) 1.20
The mortality risk associated with social disconnection is comparable to smoking up to 15 cigarettes per day and exceeds the risk associated with obesity and physical inactivity.
A subsequent meta-analysis (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2015) examined 70 prospective studies (N = 3,407,134) and distinguished between social isolation, loneliness, and living alone. All three predicted increased mortality: social isolation (RR = 1.29), loneliness (RR = 1.26), and living alone (RR = 1.32).
Importantly, loneliness predicted mortality independently of social isolation, suggesting that subjective relational experience (feeling unknown, unseen, disconnected) has physiological consequences beyond objective social contact.
Cacioppo et al. (2015) review evidence that loneliness is associated with elevated blood pressure, increased inflammation, impaired immune function, dysregulated cortisol rhythms, and accelerated cognitive decline.
2.4 Solitary Confinement: The Extreme Case
Research on solitary confinement provides stark demonstration of human relational constitution.
Grassian (1983), based on psychiatric evaluations of inmates in solitary confinement, identified a specific syndrome characterised by hypersensitivity to external stimuli, perceptual distortions and hallucinations, panic attacks, difficulty thinking and concentrating, memory problems, paranoia, and impulses toward self-harm.
Haney (2003), reviewing decades of studies, concludes that “there is not a single published study of solitary confinement... that has failed to document negative psychological effects” (p. 130). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture has called for a ban on solitary confinement exceeding 15 days, characterising prolonged isolation as cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (Méndez, 2011).
2.5 Anthropology: The Universality of Relational Structures
Brown (1991), in Human Universals, catalogues features present in all known human cultures. Relational structures feature prominently: kinship systems, marriage, family structures, reciprocity and cooperation, rituals of bonding, practices of reconciliation, mourning of death, and concepts of betrayal as a serious wrong.
The universality of these structures suggests that they are expressions of human nature itself.
2.6 Phenomenology: First-Person Evidence
The phenomenology of lived experience provides first-person confirmation:
Being truly known by another person produces profound fulfilment
Isolation is experienced as the absence of communion: being unseen, unknown, disconnected
Persons are experienced as fundamentally different from objects: irreducible, mattering infinitely
Death is feared not primarily as cessation of experience but as severance of relationships
The convergence of phenomenological evidence across individuals, cultures, and historical periods constitutes significant data about human nature (Zahavi, 2005).
2.7 Summary of Evidence
Discipline Key Finding Developmental Psychology Selfhood emerges through attachment; secure attachment predicts lifelong wellbeing Neuroscience Brain is structured for social cognition; social pain activates physical pain circuitry Epidemiology Social isolation increases mortality by 26–50%; comparable to smoking Solitary Confinement Research Isolation causes severe psychological deterioration Anthropology Relational structures are universal across human cultures Phenomenology Being known fulfils; isolation devastates; persons are irreducibly different from objects
This convergent evidence from multiple independent disciplines establishes the first premise of the Communion Argument: human beings are constitutively relational.
3. The Argument’s Formal Structure
Premise 1 (Empirical): Human beings are constitutively relational. We are made for personal communion in a way that shapes our development, cognition, health, and flourishing.
Support: The convergent evidence reviewed in Section 2.
Premise 2 (Disjunctive): This relational constitution is either:
(A) Ungrounded: an accident of evolutionary processes, useful for survival and reproduction, but pointing to nothing ultimate; or
(B) Grounded: a reflection of and participation in ultimate reality, which is itself personal and relational.
Premise 3 (Evaluative): Option (B) better explains the evidence than Option (A), because:
(i) It explains why communion fulfils beyond survival value;
(ii) It explains why isolation devastates beyond reproductive cost;
(iii) It explains why persons are experienced as irreducibly different from objects;
(iv) It explains the universality of relational structures across human cultures.
Premise 4 (Theological): If ultimate reality is personal and relational, then God is not solitary but inherently communal. This is precisely what Trinitarian theism claims, and the Trinity is not merely a theological postulate but is evidentially established through historical testimony.
Conclusion: The evidence of human relational constitution, combined with the historical evidence for the Trinity, supports Trinitarian theism over naturalism.
4. Comparative Evaluation of Explanations
4.1 The Naturalist Explanation
On the naturalist view, human relational constitution is explained by evolutionary processes. Social species survive and reproduce better; thus, natural selection has produced beings oriented toward social bonding.
This explanation has merit but faces explanatory gaps:
The Depth Problem. Evolutionary pressures select for behaviours that enhance survival. But human relational experience exceeds survival utility. The profound fulfilment of being truly known, the devastating grief of losing a loved one, the experience of persons as mattering infinitely: these exceed what survival logic predicts.
Naturalists may respond that these are “side effects” of adaptive systems. But this treats our deepest experiences as illusions. The felt sense that communion matters ultimately is, on this view, false.
The Grounding Problem. The naturalist explanation tells us that we are relational and how we became so. It does not explain why relationality should matter ultimately. If the universe is fundamentally impersonal, our orientation toward communion is an orientation toward something cosmically insignificant.
4.2 The Theistic Explanation
On the theistic view, human relational constitution is grounded in ultimate reality. We are oriented toward communion because we are made by a personal God for relationship.
Depth Explained. If communion is grounded in ultimate reality, its depth is expected. The profound fulfilment of being known participates in being known by God.
Universality Explained. If relational constitution reflects human nature as created, its universality across cultures is expected.
Persons Irreducible. The phenomenological evidence that persons matter in ways objects do not fits naturally with a view on which personhood is fundamental.
4.3 The Question of Meaning’s Grounding
A sophisticated naturalist might respond: relational experiences are meaningful because we are the kinds of beings for whom relationships constitute identity and value, not because the cosmos agrees. “Local meaning” suffices; cosmic grounding is unnecessary.
This response merits examination. It is coherent but carries costs:
The Moral Parallel. If relational significance is “local” (mattering to us but not cosmically), the same logic applies to moral claims. “Torturing children is wrong” becomes wrong to us, not cosmically. Most naturalists resist moral anti-realism, but it is unclear how to maintain moral realism while accepting that relational significance is merely local.
The Self-Understanding Problem. “Local meaning” requires systematically discounting our deepest self-understanding. The phenomenology says persons matter ultimately. The naturalist says no, only locally. This overrides phenomenological evidence with a prior metaphysical commitment.
The Tragedy Implication. If our deepest constitution is oriented toward nothing ultimately real, we are beings fundamentally at odds with reality. This is coherent but striking, and arguably less plausible than the alternative.
5. The Evidential Basis for the Trinitarian Specification
A crucial question remains: why specifically the Trinity? Even if ultimate reality is personal and relational, why think it is tri-personal?
A common assumption (which I initially shared) treats the Trinity as “theologically revealed” in contrast to “evidentially established.” But this dichotomy is false. The biblical documents themselves claim to present evidence:
“Many have undertaken to draw up an account of the things that have been fulfilled among us, just as they were handed down to us by those who from the first were eyewitnesses and servants of the word. With this in mind, since I myself have carefully investigated everything from the beginning, I too decided to write an orderly account for you, most excellent Theophilus, so that you may know the certainty of the things you have been taught.” – Luke 1:1–4
“These are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and that by believing you may have life in his name.” – John 20:31
“That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked at and our hands have touched – this we proclaim concerning the Word of life.” – 1 John 1:1
The biblical writers claim to present eyewitness testimony and evidence, not fideistic assertions. The Trinity doctrine emerged as the best explanation of convergent historical evidence.
5.1 Evidence Stream 1: Jewish Monotheism as Background
The disciples of Jesus were Jews, strict monotheists. The Shema was Judaism’s central confession: “Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God, the LORD is one” (Deuteronomy 6:4). First-century Jews would not worship a human being or invoke any entity as divine unless compelled by evidence. The theological cost of what the early Christians did (apparent violation of Jewish monotheism) was enormous.
Bauckham (2008) argues that early Christology was not a gradual deification of Jesus but an immediate inclusion of Jesus within the identity of the one God of Israel. This requires explanation: what evidence compelled Jewish monotheists to worship Jesus?
5.2 Evidence Stream 2: Jesus’s Self-Understanding
The historical evidence indicates Jesus claimed divine prerogatives:
Claim Textual Evidence Implication Forgiving sins Mark 2:5–7 Only God forgives sins against God; the scribes understood this as blasphemy Pre-existence John 8:58 (”Before Abraham was, I AM”) Claim to eternal existence using the divine name Unity with the Father John 10:30 (”I and the Father are one”) Jewish audience attempted stoning for blasphemy Receiving worship Matthew 28:9; John 20:28 Jews worshipped God alone Authority over divine institutions Mark 2:28 (Lord of Sabbath); Matthew 12:6 (greater than Temple) Claimed authority over what God instituted Universal authority Matthew 28:18 (”All authority in heaven and earth”) Divine sovereignty
The criterion of embarrassment supports the authenticity of these claims: the early church would not have invented material that created theological difficulties (Meier, 1991). The criterion of multiple attestation confirms that these claims appear across independent sources.
5.3 Evidence Stream 3: The Resurrection
The resurrection is the evidential hinge. If Jesus rose from the dead, his divine claims are vindicated. The historical evidence includes:
Early Testimony. Paul’s creed in 1 Corinthians 15:3–7 dates to within 3–5 years of the crucifixion (Habermas, 2005). This is too early for legendary development. Paul lists witnesses: Peter, the Twelve, 500+ at once (most still alive when Paul wrote), James, all the apostles, and Paul himself.
Multiple Attestation. The resurrection is attested across independent sources: Paul’s letters, Mark, Matthew, Luke-Acts, John, early creeds embedded in the text, and early preaching in Acts. These sources vary in perspective, vocabulary, and detail, suggesting independent access to the tradition rather than literary dependence.
The Empty Tomb. All sources agree the tomb was empty. The Jewish authorities did not produce the body; they alleged the disciples stole it (Matthew 28:13), implicitly conceding the tomb was empty. The discovery by women is likely authentic, since women’s testimony was not highly valued in first-century Jewish culture (criterion of embarrassment).
Post-Resurrection Appearances. The appearances are multiply attested and varied: to individuals (Peter, James, Paul), small groups (the Twelve), and large groups (500+). They involved conversation, eating, and physical contact, not mere visions.
Transformation of the Disciples. The disciples went from hiding in fear (Mark 14:50; John 20:19) to proclaiming the resurrection publicly, suffering persecution, and dying for their testimony. As Licona (2010) argues, this transformation requires explanation. People die for what they believe is true; they do not die for what they know is false.
Origin of the Church. Something launched a movement that conquered the Roman Empire. The disciples claimed it was the resurrection. Wright (2003) argues that no other hypothesis adequately explains the origin of Christian belief in resurrection.
Habermas (2005), surveying over 1,400 scholarly sources on the resurrection, identifies a “minimal facts” approach: facts accepted by the vast majority of scholars, including sceptical ones. These include: (1) Jesus died by crucifixion; (2) the disciples believed they experienced appearances of the risen Jesus; (3) their lives were transformed; (4) the resurrection was proclaimed very early; (5) James, the sceptical brother of Jesus, was converted; (6) Paul, the persecutor, was converted.
5.4 Evidence Stream 4: The Spirit’s Distinct Personhood
Jesus spoke of the Spirit as “another Advocate” (John 14:16), using allos (another of the same kind), not heteros (another of a different kind). The Spirit is described with personal attributes:
Can be lied to and tested (Acts 5:3–4, 9)
Can be grieved (Ephesians 4:30)
Teaches and reminds (John 14:26)
Guides into truth (John 16:13)
Intercedes with groanings (Romans 8:26–27)
Has a mind (Romans 8:27)
Distributes gifts “as he determines” (1 Corinthians 12:11)
The early church experienced the Spirit as a distinct personal presence, not an impersonal force, but someone who could be known, resisted, or lied to. Levison (2009) documents that the early Christian experience of the Spirit was phenomenologically robust and consistent across communities.
5.5 Evidence Stream 5: Triadic Pattern in Early Practice
The evidence shows the early church consistently operated with a three-fold pattern:
Baptismal formula: “In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit” (Matthew 28:19)
Benedictions: “The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit be with you all” (2 Corinthians 13:14)
Doxologies: Trinitarian structure in worship and praise
Prayer patterns: To the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit
This triadic pattern is embedded in the earliest strata of Christian practice, too early to be later theological development. Hurtado (2003) argues that binitarian and trinitarian worship patterns emerged within the first two decades of the Christian movement.
5.6 The Trinity as Inference to Best Explanation
The doctrine of the Trinity emerged because the early church had to make sense of evidence that did not fit existing categories:
The Data:
There is one God (Jewish monotheism, affirmed by Jesus and apostles)
Jesus is divine (his claims, resurrection, worship of him)
The Spirit is divine and personal (experience, Jesus’s teaching, apostolic testimony)
Father, Son, and Spirit are somehow distinct (Jesus prays to the Father; the Spirit is “another”)
Competing Explanations:
Hypothesis Problem Modalism (one God appearing in three modes) Contradicts the distinctions: Jesus prays to the Father, not to himself; the Spirit is “another” Tritheism (three separate gods) Contradicts Jewish monotheism, which Jesus and apostles affirm Subordinationism (Son and Spirit are lesser divine beings) Contradicts evidence of full divinity: worship, divine prerogatives, “I and the Father are one” Adoptionism (Jesus became divine) Contradicts pre-existence claims and early high Christology Trinity (one God, three co-equal persons) Accounts for all the data without contradiction
The Trinity is not arbitrary theological speculation. It is the only formulation that holds together the evidential constraints: monotheism, Christ’s full divinity, the Spirit’s personhood, and their real distinctions.
5.7 Why Three?
The Communion Argument suggests that if ultimate reality is communion, God must be inherently relational. But why specifically three persons?
Philosophical Intuition. A dyad can be closed: two in exclusive relationship. A triad opens: the love between two overflows to a third, modelling a communion that is complete yet generative. Three is the minimum for communion that is both perfect and open to further inclusion.
Evidential Constraint. More fundamentally, the evidence points to three: Father, Son, and Spirit are each identified as divine and personal in the earliest Christian sources. The number is not philosophically derived but historically encountered.
Convergence. The Communion Argument anticipates a relational God; the historical evidence specifies the triune God. The philosophical expectation and the historical testimony converge on the same conclusion.
6. The Therapeutic Implications: Why Naturalistic Approaches Cannot Restore Communion
The Communion Argument receives striking practical confirmation from an unexpected source: the failure of naturalistic therapeutic approaches to restore what they have accurately diagnosed.
6.1 The Paradox of Progress Without Healing
Modern psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience have achieved remarkable advances in describing human relationality. We understand attachment systems, neural correlates of social bonding, the physiology of loneliness, and the epidemiology of social isolation. Yet despite this descriptive sophistication, rates of relational brokenness continue to rise.
Mental Health Trends (United States):
Indicator Trend Major depressive episodes among adults Increased 52% from 2005 to 2017 (Twenge et al., 2019) Anxiety disorders Increased significantly, especially among young adults Suicide rates Increased 35% from 1999 to 2018 (CDC, 2020) Loneliness 61% of young adults report feeling lonely (Cigna, 2019) Social trust Declining for decades
Therapeutic Resources (United States):
Resource Status Licensed psychologists Increasing annually Psychiatrists ~30,000+ practicing Mental health spending Over $225 billion annually Antidepressant prescriptions ~13% of adults, up from 7.7% in 1999–2002 (NCHS, 2020) Therapy availability More accessible than ever through telehealth
The paradox is stark: we have more therapeutic resources than ever before (more clinicians, more medications, more modalities, more accessibility), yet rates of loneliness, anxiety, depression, and suicide continue to climb. This is not what we would expect if the naturalistic framework were sufficient.
6.2 The Limits of Clinical Intervention
Honest clinicians acknowledge the limits of their interventions:
Symptom Management vs. Cure. Modern psychiatry largely manages symptoms rather than curing underlying conditions. Antidepressants moderate depressive episodes; they do not resolve the conditions that produce them. Anti-anxiety medications reduce acute symptoms; they do not address the relational ruptures that generate anxiety. As Whitaker (2010) documents, long-term outcomes for many psychiatric conditions have not improved despite decades of psychopharmacological advancement.
Therapy’s Modest Effects. Meta-analyses of psychotherapy outcomes show modest effect sizes. Wampold (2015) estimates that psychotherapy accounts for about 5–10% of variance in outcomes: real but limited. Many clients remain in therapy for years without experiencing deep healing. The “therapeutic alliance” is consistently the strongest predictor of outcomes, suggesting that relationship, not technique, is the active ingredient.
The Deepest Wounds Resist Treatment. Clinicians report that the deepest relational wounds (abandonment, betrayal, shame, the experience of being fundamentally unseen) often resist therapeutic intervention. As van der Kolk (2014) observes in his work on trauma, “the body keeps the score”: wounds are inscribed in physiology and phenomenology in ways that cognitive interventions struggle to reach.
The Persistence of Existential Suffering. Even when symptoms are managed, existential suffering often persists. Clients may function better while still experiencing profound loneliness, meaninglessness, or alienation. Yalom (2008), from an existentialist perspective, acknowledges that therapy cannot resolve the “ultimate concerns” (death, isolation, meaninglessness, freedom) that drive much human suffering.
6.3 Why This Is Predicted by Theism
If the Communion Argument is correct, this therapeutic failure is exactly what we would expect.
On the naturalist view, human beings are biopsychosocial systems. Relational suffering is functional dysregulation: a problem to be solved through appropriate intervention. We would expect that accurate description of the problem would yield effective intervention. Better neuroscience should mean better healing.
But if human beings are made for communion, if our relational constitution reflects ultimate reality rather than evolutionary accident, then our brokenness is not merely functional. It is personal. We are not malfunctioning systems but wounded persons. And wounded persons require something different from recalibration: they require reconciliation.
Consider the difference:
Naturalist Framework Theistic Framework Problem: Functional dysregulation Problem: Relational rupture Solution: Intervention, recalibration Solution: Reconciliation, restoration Agent: Technique, medication Agent: Person, relationship Goal: Symptom reduction Goal: Communion restored Mechanism: Neurochemical adjustment Mechanism: Love, forgiveness, being known
The naturalist framework treats the person as a system. But our deepest wounds are not systemic; they are personal. The silence of a father. The betrayal of a spouse. The experience of being unseen by those who should have seen us. These are not malfunctions to be corrected but ruptures to be healed.
6.4 What Theism Offers That Naturalism Cannot
Christianity addresses human brokenness not as a therapeutic problem but as a relational one. It offers what naturalistic approaches structurally cannot:
To Be Known, Not Just Assessed. Naturalistic therapy involves assessment, diagnosis, and treatment planning. The client is understood in categories. Christianity offers something different: a God who knows us by name, who has “searched me and known me” (Psalm 139:1), who knows “the very hairs of your head” (Matthew 10:30). This is not categorisation but personal knowledge: the very thing our relational constitution craves.
To Be Healed, Not Just Managed. Naturalistic psychiatry manages symptoms. Christianity claims actual healing: “By his wounds we are healed” (Isaiah 53:5). This is not metaphor but ontological claim: that the God who is communion can restore wounded persons to communion.
To Be Forgiven, Not Just Reframed. Cognitive therapy reframes guilt and shame. Christianity offers something more radical: actual forgiveness from the One against whom all sin is ultimately committed. “If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness” (1 John 1:9). Reframing adjusts our perspective; forgiveness restores the relationship.
To Belong, Not Just Connect. Social interventions facilitate connection. Christianity offers incorporation into a body: the church as the community of those being healed, the “body of Christ” (1 Corinthians 12:27) where each member belongs and is needed. This is not networking but ontological belonging.
To Matter, Not Just Be Validated. Therapeutic validation affirms feelings. Christianity grounds human significance in the image of God. We matter not because a therapist says so but because we are created by Communion for communion, known before we were born (Jeremiah 1:5), destined for eternal relationship with God.
6.5 The Healer Is a Person, Not a Protocol
The deepest difference is this: Christianity offers not a technique but a Person.
The naturalist healer is an intervention: a medication, a modality, a protocol. The Christian healer is Jesus Christ, a Person who became human, bore human suffering, and offers not mere treatment but relationship.
“Come to me, all you who are weary and burdened, and I will give you rest.” – Matthew 11:28
This is not a therapeutic protocol. It is an invitation to communion with the One who made us for communion.
This is why many who have found no lasting help in therapy find healing in Christ. Not because therapy is worthless (it has genuine value), but because it addresses the symptom while missing the disease. The disease is alienation from God and others. The cure is reconciliation. And reconciliation comes not through technique but through a Person who bears our wounds and welcomes us into communion.
6.6 The Existential Confirmation
The failure of naturalistic therapy to restore human communion is not merely a clinical observation. It is existential confirmation of the Communion Argument’s thesis.
If naturalism were true and sufficient:
Accurate description should yield effective intervention
More resources should mean more healing
Better neuroscience should mean less brokenness
None of these predictions has been confirmed. We describe brilliantly and heal poorly. We have unprecedented resources and unprecedented loneliness. We understand the brain better than ever and suffer more than our grandparents did.
The naturalist may attribute this to complexity, insufficient knowledge, or social factors. These explanations have merit at the margins. But the pattern suggests something deeper: we are treating personal wounds with impersonal methods, relational ruptures with mechanical interventions.
If the Communion Argument is correct, this is exactly what we would expect. And the solution it points toward (not better technique but reconciliation with the God who is Communion) is exactly what we need.
7. Objections and Replies
7.1 Objection: Evolution Suffices
Objection: The evolutionary explanation is fully adequate. No God needed.
Reply: Evolution explains the mechanism of relational constitution but not its meaning. It does not explain why communion fulfils beyond survival value, why isolation devastates beyond reproductive cost, or why persons seem to matter infinitely.
To say “evolution explains it” and stop there is to confuse proximate and ultimate explanation. Evolution explains how we came to be relational. It does not explain whether that relationality tracks anything real.
7.2 Objection: Phenomenological Depth ≠ Ontological Truth
Objection: Just because relational experiences feel deep and significant does not mean they track metaphysical reality. Emotional power is not epistemic warrant.
Reply: All evidence is phenomenological at base. Perception is phenomenological: we experience the world and draw inferences. The naturalist trusts perception to track reality despite its evolutionary origins. Why trust perception but not relational phenomenology?
Both are products of evolved systems. If we discount relational experience because it is evolved, consistency requires discounting perceptual experience too. The question is not whether phenomenology is evidential, but which phenomenological experiences we treat as tracking reality.
7.3 Objection: Local Meaning Suffices
Objection: Meaning does not require cosmic grounding. Things can matter to us without mattering cosmically.
Reply: This is coherent but carries costs. If applied consistently, it destabilises moral realism: moral claims become true “for us” but not cosmically. Most resist this implication.
Moreover, “local meaning” requires treating our deepest self-understanding (that persons matter ultimately) as systematically mistaken. This overrides phenomenological evidence with a prior metaphysical commitment.
7.4 Objection: The Trinity is Retrospectively Fitted
Objection: The Trinity is a later theological construct imposed on earlier, simpler beliefs.
Reply: The evidence contradicts this. Hurtado (2003) and Bauckham (2008) demonstrate that high Christology and binitarian/trinitarian worship patterns appear in the earliest strata of Christian evidence, within the first two decades.
The triadic baptismal formula, Pauline benedictions, and creedal material all predate the theological controversies that led to the formal doctrine of the Trinity. The doctrine codified what was already present in practice and experience.
7.5 Objection: Other Relational Theisms Suffice
Objection: Process theism, panentheism, or other conceptions of personal ultimate reality could account for human relationality without invoking the Trinity.
Reply: This objection has force against the philosophical argument alone. But the Communion Argument is completed by historical evidence that specifies the Triune God:
Process theism and panentheism are not supported by the historical evidence for Jesus’s divine claims, resurrection, or the Spirit’s distinct personhood
These alternatives must explain the same evidence that led the early church to Trinitarian belief
The convergence of philosophical anticipation (relational God) with historical testimony (Father, Son, Spirit) favours the Trinity specifically
7.6 Objection: The Argument is Unfalsifiable
Objection: No possible data could falsify this argument. All experiences are interpreted through the theological lens.
Reply: The argument is falsifiable at multiple points:
Finding Effect on Argument Relational constitution is culturally variable Weakens Premise 1 Isolation does not harm health Weakens Premise 1 Attachment is not developmentally necessary Weakens Premise 1 Resurrection evidence is better explained by alternatives Weakens historical case Early Christology was low and gradually developed Weakens Trinitarian specification Naturalistic therapy produces deep, lasting healing Weakens therapeutic confirmation
The evidence could have been otherwise. It was not. That is evidential support, not confirmation bias.
7.7 Objection: Therapeutic Failure Has Other Explanations
Objection: The failure of therapy to fully heal reflects complexity, underfunding, or social factors, not metaphysical inadequacy.
Reply: These factors are real but do not fully explain the pattern. We have more resources, more knowledge, and more accessibility than ever, yet outcomes have not improved proportionally. The pattern suggests not merely insufficient technique but inappropriate framework: treating personal wounds with impersonal methods.
Moreover, the most effective therapeutic factor (the therapeutic alliance) is relational, not technical. This supports the thesis: healing comes through relationship, not mechanism. Christianity generalises this insight: ultimate healing comes through ultimate relationship.
8. The Complete Evidential Chain
The Communion Argument provides a complete evidential pathway from empirical data to Trinitarian Christianity:
Step 1: Empirical Evidence of Relational Constitution Human beings are constitutively relational, confirmed by developmental psychology, neuroscience, epidemiology, anthropology, and phenomenology. This is among the most robust findings in the human sciences.
Step 2: Metaphysical Inference This constitution requires explanation. Either it is ungrounded (pointing to nothing ultimate) or grounded (reflecting ultimate reality). The grounded explanation better accounts for the depth, universality, and significance of relational experience.
Step 3: Specification of Relational Ultimate If ultimate reality is personal and relational, God is inherently communal, not solitary. The Communion Argument anticipates a God who is communion.
Step 4: Historical Evidence for the Trinity The historical evidence specifies this relational God: Jesus of Nazareth claimed divine status while being distinct from the Father. His resurrection vindicates these claims. The Spirit is experienced as a distinct divine person. The early church worshipped and experienced God as triune.
Step 5: Therapeutic Confirmation The failure of naturalistic therapy to restore communion, despite accurate diagnosis, confirms that human brokenness is personal, not merely functional. We require reconciliation, not recalibration. This is what Christianity offers.
Step 6: Convergence The philosophical expectation (relational God), the historical testimony (Father, Son, Spirit), and the therapeutic evidence (personal wounds require personal healing) converge. The Trinity is not arbitrary theological speculation but the best explanation of convergent evidence: empirical, historical, and practical.
Conclusion: The Communion Argument, completed by historical and therapeutic evidence, provides an evidential case for Trinitarian theism with existential implications for human healing and hope.
9. Conclusion
The evidence is clear: human beings are made for communion. We are constitutively relational beings whose development, cognition, health, and flourishing depend on personal connection. This fact, one of the most robust findings across the human sciences, requires explanation.
Either our relational nature is an ungrounded accident, useful for survival but pointing to nothing ultimate, or it reflects the structure of reality itself. The second explanation is superior: it accounts for the depth of relational experience, the devastation of isolation, the irreducibility of persons, and the universality of relational structures.
If ultimate reality is personal and relational, then God is communion, eternally relational in the divine nature. This is precisely what Trinitarian Christianity claims. And this claim is not mere theological assertion but is evidentially grounded in the testimony of those who encountered Jesus, witnessed his resurrection, and experienced the Spirit as a distinct divine person.
The therapeutic failure of naturalistic approaches provides existential confirmation. We have diagnosed human brokenness with exquisite precision, and yet we cannot heal it with our best techniques. This is exactly what we would expect if our wounds are personal rather than functional, requiring reconciliation rather than recalibration.
Christianity offers what naturalism cannot: not a better technique but a Person. Not management but healing. Not reframing but forgiveness. Not networking but belonging. Not validation but significance grounded in the image of God.
We are made for communion because we are made by Communion: the eternal self-giving love of Father, Son, and Spirit, from whose overflow we are created and into whose life we are invited.
The door is open. The invitation stands.
“Behold, I stand at the door and knock. If anyone hears my voice and opens the door, I will come in to him and eat with him, and he with me.” – Revelation 3:20
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Soli Deo Gloria